RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Taxation-Immunity of Federal Employees from State Income Taxation-[Federal]-The State of New York sued to collect an income tax
levied by it upon the salary of an employee of the Home Owners Loan Corporation.
Held, judgment for the State. Without deciding whether the HOLC is an essential
activity of the federal government, the Court found that a tax on the income of employees is not a substantial burden upon a governmental activity. Graves v. O'Keefe.'
The instant case2 is a significant step in the current reconsideration and restatement3 of the tax immunity doctrine by means of which essential activities of the state
governments are exempted from taxation by the national government, and activities
of the national government are exempted from taxation by the states.4 This implied
limitation on the taxing power of both the state and national governments was originated by the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Marylands as an incident to the supremacy of federal legislation, and was extended some fifty years later in Collector v. Day?
to preserve the sovereignty of the states at a time when it was threatened by a
strengthened nationalism.7 As the doctrine developed, the Court has distinguished between proprietary (non-essential) activity and governmental (essential) activity,8 denying immunity to the former and exempting the latter from
159 S. Ct. 59S (9.39)2Expressly overruled by this decision is the line of cases including Dobbins v. Comm'n of
Erie County, 41 U.S. 434 (x842); Collector v. Day, zi Wall. (U.S.) x13 (1870); New York ex
rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1936); and Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352 (1936).
3 This decision is a corollary to Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), which held
that salaries of employees of the Port of New York Authority were taxable by the federal
government since the burden of the tax upon the government of New York was merely speculative. See also James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (937), and Helvering v.
Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), overruling Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S.
501 (1922) and Bumet v. Coronado Oil Co., 285 U.S. 393 (i932). See 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
679 (1938).
4McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 326 (i819); Collector v. Day, i Wall. (U.S.)
x13 (x871); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1930).
s 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 315 (18i9) (prohibiting the state of Maryland from levying a tax on notes
of the Bank of the United States). The national government was deemed supreme in the
sense that the part must not be allowed to govern the whole. A tax levied on the activities of
the national government by a state is truly "taxation without representation." Mr. Justice
Stone in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 412 (1938).
6 1 Wall. (U.S.) 113 (1871) (federal tax on income of a state judge held invalid).
7Collector v. Day has been much criticized. See, e.g., the dissenting opinion in that case
by Mr. Justice Bradley: "In my judgment, the limitation on the power of taxation in the
general government which the present decision establishes, will be found very difficult of control ..... I cannot but regard it as founded on a fallacy, and that it will lead to mischievous
consequences .... no concession of any of the just powers of the general government can
easily be recalled." i Wall. (U.S.) 113, 129 (1871).
9The measure of an "essential" governmental activity is not a simple one. The confusion of
the cases may be due to a conflict on the basic premise. One view holds that the concept is one
of changing content, as expressed by Mr. Justice Black, concurring in the Gerhardt case,
"There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of demarcation between essential and
nonessential governmental functions." Our form of government provides that the people have
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"direct"9 although not from "indirect" or "conjectural" burdens.o Since every immunity granted of necessity results in a deprivation of revenue to the taxing body, a denial
to either government of the power to tax in order to safeguard "some remote antecedent benefit '""x to the other would seem an unjust encroachment upon the sovereign
power to tax. Inasmuch as the policy behind national immunity is the maintenance of
national supremacy, and the policy behind state immunity is the prevention of interference with activity essential to the preservation of the state governments, the immunities are not, in the strict sense of the term, "reciprocal." 2
The instant case, by its statement that the problem of "burden" is a question of fact,
implicitly adopts Mr. Justice Brandeis' contention3 that a distinction should be drawn
between an interpretation or construction of the Constitution by the Court and the
application of that construction to the particular case, the former being a question of
law, the latter of fact'4 Thus, the determination by the Court of a fact should be open
to reconsideration at any time in view of the presence of new and more precise data, a
new approach, or a change in general conditions. In addition the opinion follows a dual
system of stare decisis also propounded by Mr. Justice Brandeis.s Strict adherence to
the "power to determine as conditions demand, what services and functions the public welfare requires." On the other hand, Mr. justice Stone, in the same case, contends that
the concept is fixed and that the restriction on national taxing power was "devised as a shield to
protect the states from curtailment of the essential operations of government which they have
exercised from the beginning" (italics added). Cases are collected in 17 N.C. L. Rev. 62, 66
(1938).
9Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (i895) (holding invalid a federal
income tax on state and municipal bonds); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283
U.S. 570 (1930) (federal excise tax on sale of motorcycles to police department of municipality prohibited).
z°Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1925) (upholding a federal tax on net income of consulting engineer for municipal works); Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931) (upholding a federal tax upon income derived from the sale of municipal and county lands); James
v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (wherein a state tax upon the gross income of
an independent contractor engaged exclusively in federal construction was sustained).
"zLanguage of Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil Co., 285 U.S.
393, 403 (1932).
12 Chief Justice Marshall pointed out in the McCulloch case that there are certain political
checks on national taxation of the states, but that a tax levied on national agencies by a state
government is a tax levied without adequate representation. Although the court has intimated otherwise, it would seem that the test of "essential" function is inapplicable to the
national government. By the very nature of the federal system of delegated powers in the
national government, all activity is "necessary" that is constitutional. See notes 5,6, and 8,
.rupra.
'3 Dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932).
14 Other examples given by Mr. Justice Brandeis of questions of fact: (i)
in cases under the
due process clause whether the legislation is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, (2) in
cases under the equal protection clause whether there is any reasonable basis for the classification made by the statute, (3)in cases under the commerce clause whether the admitted burden
laid by the state statute is so substantial as to be deemed direct. The issue in these cases resembles the use and application of the reasonable man standard in torts.
's

Note 13, szrpra.
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precedent makes for the desirable end of certainty in the law, but also for rigidity.
In the field of legislation, an undesirable precedent is readily remedied by statute; but
a "wrong" interpretation of the Constitution, unless the Court is willing to overrule
itself, requires the prolonged process of amendment for rectification. In controversies
involving the interpretation of the Constitution, therefore, the Court should "bow to
the lessons of experience 6 and the force of better reasoning."7
With the recognition of "burden" as a question of economic fact, the way is open for
a reconsideration of the cases involving taxation of income from government bonds and
allied problems.' 8 As long as the tax is non-discriminatory and not direct'9 there seems
to be little danger of "destruction" of essential activity.2o
The scope of the decision is narrowed somewhat by the express reservation for later
determination of the situation where Congress by legislation in terms has expressly
exempted federal employees from income taxation by the states. In a footnote to the
Gerhardtcase" the Court intimated that such an exemption might be possible. It has
been argued that the basis of the McCulloch case is the finding by the Court of an
implied intent in Congress to declare the national bank notes exempt from state
taxation. 22 However, since the instant case and the cases it overrules have never regarded the non-consent of the federal government as relevant (it impliedly being always present), the rationale of the possible immunity is diflficult to see.3 The present
Congress, for obvious political reasons, has not seen fit to follow the suggestion of the
x6Mr.

Justice Brandeis probably uses the word advisedly in the sense of public opinion.
Note 13, supra. Cf. Taney, C. J., in The Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U.S.) 282, 470 (1849):
"I .... am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as a law of this court, that its opinion
upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is supposed to
have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether
on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported."
isPollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). See discussion of the application of the Sixteenth Amendment by Mr. Justice Black, concurring, in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938).
9 Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting, in Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352, 375 (1936),
observes that the reciprocal rights and immunities of the state and national governments
may be adequately safeguarded by these two limitations on the taxing power. His statement
that any additional exemption is unsound because state and federal business ought to bear
their proportionate share of taxation "in order that comparison may be made between the
cost of conducting public and private business" is interesting when applied to the contemporary
controversy over the T.V.A. "yardstick."
20 In his concurring opinion in the instant case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter traces the tax
immunity confusion to the "seductive clicA" of Chief Justice Marshall in the McCulloch case
that "the power to tax is the power to destroy." Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) introduced the modern view when he wrote, "The
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."
"304 U.S. 405, 411 (1937).
2 See opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in the instant case.
23Any exemption of salaries would probably be based upon the "necessary and proper"
clause. It would have to contend with the statement by Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 33
that "a law for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of the
State (unless upon imports and exports), would not be the supreme law of the land, but a
usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution."
'7
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Court and to immunize federal employees by express legislation. With the way opened
by the decisions in the Gerhardtcase and the instant case, Congress has passed legisla4
tion to permit reciprocal income taxation by the federal and state governments.2

Taxation-Domicil-Interpleader of Rival Claimants to Inheritance Taxes[Federal].-The state of Texas filed in the United States Supreme Court an original
bill in the nature of interpleader' against three other states, asking a determination of
the domicil of the decedent for the purpose of deciding which of the four states could
impose death taxes upon the decedent's intangibles. The decedent's next-of-kin was
joined as defendant. The total taxes claimed by the several states were in excess of the
total net value of the estate. Held (Justices Frankfurter and Black dissenting), the
Court has jurisdiction of the cause and the special master's finding that the decedent
was domiciled in Massachusetts at the time of his death should be confirmed. State of
2
Texas v. State of Florida.
In the notable case of FirstNationalBank v. Maine,3 the Supreme Court established
the rule that a state statute imposing death taxes upon intangibles of decedents not
domiciled in the state infringes the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Shortly thereafter, there
arose in the Dorrancecasess the problem of the constitutionality of multiple taxation of
the same intangible estate based upon conflicting determinations by state courts as to
the place of the decedent's domicile, These cases, however, failed to settle the problem
since the appeal to the United States Supreme Court from one of the state courts was
dismissed on the ground that the federal question "was not properly presented to ....
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania," 6 and a later action to enjoin the collection of the
New Jersey tax was dismissed as contrary to the federal statute forbidding a stay of
7
any proceedings in a state court.
In Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley' an executor filed a bill under the Federal
Interpleader Act9 joining tax officials of two states and seeking a determination of
2433

Time No. 17, at 14 (1939).

IThe Court said: "The essential of the bill in the nature of interpleader is that it calls
upon the Court to exercise its jurisdiction to guard against the risks of loss from the prosecution in independent suits of rival claims where the plaintiff himself claims an interest in the
property or fund which is subjected to the risk." State of Texas v. State of Florida, $9S. Ct.
563, 568 (1939).
2 59 S. Ct. 563 (1939).

3 284 U.S. 312 (1932).

4 The rule grew out of the cases of Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,

280 U.S.
(1930) overruling Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. i89 (19o3); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281
U.S. 586 (i93o); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. i (193o); and has been followed in City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934).
s See Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. I~r, 163 Atl. 303 (1932) cert. denied Dorrance v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 66o (1932); New Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 580 (1933); In re Dorrance,
riS N.J. Eq. 268, 17o Atl. 6or (1934); In re Dorrance, ii6 N.J. Eq. 204, 172 Atl. 503 (r934)
aff'd Dorrance v. Thayer-Martin, 13 N.J. Misc. i68, 176 Atl. 902 (1935); Hill v. Martin,
296 U.S. 393 (3935).
6Dorrance v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 66o (1932).
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7 Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393
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(i935).
949 Stat. 1o96 (1936), 28 U.S.C.A. §4r (26) (Supp. 1938).

